Ariel Rubinstein - Selected publications#


Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion Journal of Economic Theory 21 (1979), 1-9.

Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica 50 (1982), 97-110.

Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining, with A.Wolinsky, Econometrica 53 (1985), 1133-1150.

Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Journal of Economic Theory 39 (1986), 83-96.

Similarity and Decision-Making Under Risk, Journal of Economic Theory, 46 (1988), 145-153.

The Electronic Mail Game: A Game with Almost Common Knowledge, American Economic Review 79 (1989), 385-391.

Why are certain Properties of Binary relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?, Econometrica, 64 (1996), 343-356.

On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall, with M.Piccione, Games and Economic Behavior 20 (1997), 3-24.

Games with Procedurally Rational Players, with M.Osborne, American Economic Review 88 (1998), 834-847.

Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions, with J.Glazer, Journal of Economic Theory, 79 (1998), 157-173.

Dilemmas of An Economic Theorist, Econometrica, 74 (2006), 865-883.

Equilibrium in the Jungle, with Michele Piccione, Economic Journal, 117 (2007), 883-896.
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